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IT'S NOT REALLY "ASSASSINATION": LEGAL AND
MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF INTENTIONALLY
TARGETING TERRORISTS AND AGGRESSOR-STATE
REGIME ELITES *
Robert F. Turner **
I. INTRODUCTION
My interest in the subject of assassination dates back more
than thirty years when, as a junior Army officer in Vietnam, I
was detailed to the American Embassy in Saigon. I had completed
my undergraduate honors thesis on Vietnam, and as a result of
my research, I suspect that I was one of few Americans who had
actually read every word of Ho Chi Minh's four-volume Selected
Works.'
Usually, it is said, if you are drafted from a position as the
head chef of a four-star restaurant, the Army will train you to
drive a truck-rather than make use of your skills as a cook. But
in my case, someone decided to take advantage of my specialized
background. When I arrived in Vietnam after stateside service as
an infantry reconnaissance platoon leader, I was assigned to the
Embassy as Assistant Special Projects Officer2 in the North Viet-
nam/Viet Cong Affairs Division.
* This paper is an extension of remarks made on April 11, 2002 while participating
in two panel discussions at the University of Richmond School of Law Allen Chair Sympo-
sium.
** Associate Director, Center for National Security Law at the University of Virginia
School of Law. J.D., 1981, University of Virginia School of Law; S.J.D., 1996, University of
Virginia School of Law. Professor Turner previously served as National Security Advisor
to Senator Robert P. Griffin, acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs,
and Counsel to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board. The views espoused in this
piece are his own.
1. See generally Ho CHI MINH, SELECTED WORKS (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Pub-
lishing House 1960-62).
2. The Special Projects Officer to whom I reported was a particularly dedicated and
courageous Foreign Service Information Officer named Donald "Rock" Rochlen. Rochlen
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When I returned in January 1971 for a second Vietnam tour, I
was reassigned to the same job at the Embassy's request.3 A sig-
nificant part of my job involved investigating Viet Cong terror-
ism, during which time I traveled extensively around Indochina
and wrote a lengthy classified study entitled The Viet Cong Tactic
of Assassination.4 I mention this background to emphasize that I
have personally witnessed the consequences of assassination and
I do not much like the practice.
I also worked as national security adviser to a member of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for five years during the
mid-1970s. During this time, proposals were made to prohibit as-
sassination as a result of the Church Committee hearings on in-
telligence abuses.' I followed the hearings closely but opposed en-
acting an "assassination ban" as part of a proposed "legislative
charter" governing intelligence activities. This opposition rested
on the ground that on very rare occasions-such as the hypotheti-
cal assassination of Adolf Hitler on the eve of World War II-the
ability to intentionally kill a particularly horrendous tyrant
might save millions of lives.
In 1981, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,333,6
which provided that "[n]o person employed by or acting on behalf
had already served several years in Vietnam and was known by some as "Crazy Don" be-
cause of his reputation for going where the action was without due regard for his personal
safety. I had heard accounts of his exploits and expertise while in Washington in 1968 and
quickly developed great respect and admiration for him. Rochlen cared more about the
Vietnamese people and the struggle for human freedom than he did about bureaucratic
rules, and his career no doubt suffered from his insistence upon remaining in the war zone
year after year. But from my perspective, he was one of the unsung heroes of the war.
3. By coincidence, my Army assignments in Vietnam coincided with periods during
which Douglas Pike, the author of the superb M.I.T. Press volume Viet Cong-and in my
view America's leading authority on Vietnamese Communism-was on assignment in the
Tokyo Embassy. See generally DOUGLAS PIKE, VIET CONG: THE ORGANIZATION AND
TECHNIQUES OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF SOUTH VIETNAM (1965). That coinci-
dence no doubt increased the value of my far more limited knowledge of the subject to the
Embassy, as there were few Americans with strong backgrounds in Vietnamese Commu-
nism other than Pike during that time.
4. Robert F. Turner, The Viet Cong Tactic of Assassination (1971) (unpublished clas-
sified document). This piece was a sequel to Douglas Pike's monograph on the Viet Cong's
use of "terror" as war strategy. See generally DOUGLAS PIKE, THE VIET CONG STRATEGY OF
TERROR (1970).
5. See ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, S. REP. No. 94-
465 (1975) [hereinafter CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT] (detailing the conclusions of the
Church Committee).
6. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 app. at
58-64 (1994).
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of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to
engage in, assassination."7 Only days after the order was issued, I
was hired by the White House to serve as Counsel to the Presi-
dent's Intelligence Oversight Board, which was charged with
overseeing the activities of the United States intelligence com-
munity and reporting possible violations of laws or executive or-
ders directly to the President.
Since my days in the White House two 'decades ago, I have con-
tinued to follow these issues as a scholar. In October 1990, I
wrote an article in The Washington Post entitled Killing Saddam:
Would It Be a Crime ?' Summarized briefly, I argued that if Hus-
sein could not be apprehended for trial as a war criminal9 and
would not cease his aggression against Kuwait, he was in fact a
lawful target. 10 Eight years later I argued in USA Today that in-
ternational terrorist Osama bin Laden was also a lawful target if
he could be located. 1 Over the past dozen years, what was ini-
tially viewed by many as a radical suggestion in 1990 has become
accepted as a legal option by many-if not most-senior govern-
ment lawyers within the national security community. 2 Also, ac-
ceptance by the American people was emphasized by a Harris
Poll taken for CNN shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks, in which eighty-one percent of those polled responded
that they would favor "[a]ssassinations of leaders responsible for
terrorism." 3
7. Id. § 2.11.
8. Robert F. Turner, Killing Saddam: Would It Be a Crime?, WASH. POST, Oct. 7,
1990, at D1.
9. As chairman of the American Bar Association ("ABA") Standing Committee on
Law and National Security, I wrote and introduced the first resolution approved by the
ABA House of Delegates calling for a war crimes trial of Saddam Hussein in August of the
following year. See Report of the Standing Committee on Law and National Security, 116
A.B.A. ANN. REP. 133 (1991).
10. Turner, supra note 8.
11. Robert F. Turner, In Self-Defense, U.S. Has Right to Kill Terrorist bin Laden, USA
TODAY, Oct. 26, 1998, at 17A.
12. Pentagon "super-lawyer" W. Hays Parks has long reasoned that leaders like Sad-
dam Hussein are lawful targets in war and has influenced my own thinking on this issue,
as well as that of many others within and outside of the government. See W. Hays Parks,
Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination, ARMY LAW., Dec. 1989, at
4.
13. Poll Update-TIME / CNN: 81% Favor Assassinating Leaders Responsible for Ter-
rorism, The Hotline, at http://nationaljournal.com/pubs/ hotline (Sept. 18, 2001).
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II. DEFINING OUR TERMS
By definition, assassination is a form of murder. Black's Law
Dictionary defines "assassination" as "[t]he act of deliberately
killing someone, [especially] a public figure, [usually] for hire or
for political reasons."14 The 1980 Oxford Companion to Law simi-
larly defines "assassination" as "[tihe murder of a person by lying
in wait for him and then killing him, particularly the murder of
prominent people from political motives, e.g., the assassination of
President Kennedy.."5 Webster's Word Histories traces the ety-
mology of "assassin" through a variety of languages and con-
cludes: "[in all of these languages, the resulting term came to be
applied to murderers irrespective of religious or Eastern connota-
tions."16
I could provide other examples. Indeed, over the past dozen
years or so I have collected more than a dozen different defini-
tions-and every one of them uses either the term or the ele-
ments of murder.
Thus, I would suggest that what we are really talking about is
not "assassination" but the intentional targeting of regime elites
as an act of self-defense. Approaching the subject in that way also
eliminates a great deal of baggage associated with names like
Abraham Lincoln, John Kennedy, and Martin Luther King, Jr. I
think we should agree that-like all murder-"assassination" is
wrong and ought not be engaged in.
On the other hand, self-defense is a good thing-or at least a
relatively good thing, considering the alternatives. What I am
talking about are situations in which the intentional taking of the
life of one wrongdoer might reasonably be expected to prevent the
slaughter of larger numbers of innocent people.
14. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 109 (7th ed. 1999). Earlier editions of the dictionary
explicitly mentioned "murder." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 147 (4th ed. 1968) (defining
.assassination" as "[miurder committed for hire" and "murder committed treacherously or
by stealth or surprise, or by lying in wait").
15. DAVID M. WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 84 (1980) (emphasis added).
16. WEBSTER'S WORD HISTORIES 23-24 (1989) (emphasis added).
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III. THE CIA AND ASSASSINATION: DISPELLING A MYTH
Before I address the primary issue, however, I would like to di-
gress briefly by discussing the widespread belief that, until Con-
gress seized control of the helm and put an end to activities of the
"rogue elephant" Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") that had oc-
curred during the quarter century ending around 1975, the CIA
went around the world assassinating political enemies with great
enthusiasm. Many of us who lived through the Church Commit-
tee hearings recall seeing front-page photos of Senator Frank
Church holding up a special handgun allegedly designed for use
in assassinating foreign leaders. While few may have taken the
time to read it, it was widely publicized that the Church Commit-
tee had issued a massive report detailing the gristly practice of
CIA assassinations over the years.17
The Church Committee ultimately found no evidence that any-
one employed by or working on behalf of the CIA or any other
U.S. Government agency had ever assassinated anyone."8 To the
contrary, on their own initiative, Directors of Central Intelligence
("DCI") Richard Helms (in 1972) and William Colby (in 1973) "is-
sued internal CIA orders banning assassination."19 The Helms
order read:
It has recently again been alleged in the press that CIA engages in
assassination. As you are well aware, this is not the case, and
Agency policy has long been clear on this issue. To underline it, how-
ever, I direct that no such activity or operation be undertaken, as-
sisted or suggested by any of our personnel. 20
This is not to say that the CIA did not consider the intentional
killing of foreign leaders. The Church Committee identified two
foreign leaders who were at one time the subjects of assassination
plots involving the CIA.2
17. See generally CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5.
18. Id. at 256.
19. Id. at 282.
20. Id. (citing Memorandum from DCI Richard Helms to the Deputy Directors of the
CIA (Mar. 6, 1972)).
21. See discussion infra Parts HILA, III.F.
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A. Patrice Lumumba
The first such assassination plot targeted Patrice Lumumba,
the former Prime Minister of the Congo, and was summarized by
the Church Committee in these words:
Patrice Lumumba (Congo /Zaire).-In the Fall of 1960, two CIA offi-
cials were asked by superiors to assassinate Lumumba. Poisons were
sent to the Congo and some exploratory steps were taken toward
gaining access to Lumumba. Subsequently, in early 1961, Lumumba
was killed by Congolese rivals. It does not appear from the evidence
that the United States was in any way involved in the killing.
22
The Church Committee concluded that the Lumumba plot was
approved at least by DCI Allen Dulles and perhaps by President
Eisenhower, but conflicting evidence exists on whether Eisen-
hower had personally approved the plan that precluded the
Committee from making such a determination. 23 Lumumba's
Marxist radicalism and the fear that he would become an "Afri-
can Castro" motivated the desire for his removal from the politi-
cal scene.24 After becoming the first Prime Minister of the Democ-
ratic Republic of the Congo at the end of June 1960, Lumumba
sought Soviet assistance-raising fears of Leninist gains on a
growing new front in the Cold War.2' Before the assassination
plan could be implemented, a little more than two months after
taking office, Lumumba was dismissed by Congolese President
Joseph Kasavubu. 26 Lumumba refused to leave his office, a con-
frontation between the two leaders developed, and on September
14, 1960, Army Chief of Staff Joseph Mobutu (later known as
Mobutu Sese Seko) seized power and placed Lumumba under
house arrest.2 In January of the following year, Lumumba at-
tempted to escape arrest and join supporters in Stanleyville but
was captured and later executed without any apparent involve-
ment by the CIA.2" According to the Church Committee, "there is
22. Id. at 256.
23. Id. at 263.
24. See id. at 13-14, 57.
25. See id. at 13.
26. See id. at 13-14.
27. Id. at 14.
28. Id.
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no evidence that the United States was in any way involved in
Lumumba's death at the hands of his Congolese enemies."29
Before turning to the most controversial case-involving Cuban
dictator Fidel Castro-let me dispose quickly of several incidents
in which, conventional wisdom to the contrary, the Committee
concluded that the CIA had not been involved in assassination
plots.
B. Rafael Trujillo
Beginning in 1960, the United States provided support through
the CIA to dissidents in the Dominican Republic, where a corrupt
dictator, Rafael Trujillo, had reigned for three decades.3 ° Among
other offenses, Trujillo had been implicated in a bombing in-
tended to murder Venezuelan President Romulo Betancourt.31
Washington's primary concern, however, may have been that
Trujillo's brutality was creating a revolutionary situation that ul-
timately might produce another Castro.32 The CIA provided sup-
port, including a few small arms, to dissidents who assassinated
Trujillo on May 31, 1961."3
The Church Committee concluded that the CIA favored the
coup, which failed, but "did not initiate the plot" to assassinate
Trujillo. 4 However, by providing arms to dissidents who wanted
to kill Trujillo, the Committee concluded that the United States
"was implicated in the assassination, regardless of whether the
weapons actually supplied were meant to kill Trujillo or were
only intended as symbols of support for the dissidents."35
The Committee acknowledged that "[tihe day before the assas-
sination, President Kennedy cabled the State Department repre-
sentative in the Dominican Republic that the United States 'as [a]
matter of general policy cannot condone assassination."'36 The
29. Id. at 256.
30. See id. at 191-92.
31. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI: COUNTRY STUDIES 30 (Richard A. Haggerty ed.,
1991).
32. See CHURCH COMMIWEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 191.
33. See id. at 191-92.
34. Id. at 6.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 262.
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United States refused to provide machine guns requested by the
dissidents, and the CIA independently endeavored to discourage
the planned assassination. However, according to the Church
Committee report, the dissidents responded that "the assassina-
tion was their affair and that it could not be turned off to suit the
convenience of the United States Government."
38
C. Ngo Dinh Diem
Another such incident that the Committee concluded was not
an attempted assassination concerned South Vietnamese Presi-
dent Ngo Dinh Diem. According to the report, the Committee
found no evidence that the United States favored, encouraged, or
knowingly facilitated the assassination of either Ngo Dinh Diem,
or his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. 9 The decision to instruct the CIA
to inform dissident generals in Saigon that the United States
would recognize their regime if they succeeded in a coup at-
tempt-largely made by mid-level officials in the State Depart-
ment and at the White House, while several of the senior players
were out of Washington-was one of the greatest blunders of
modern American foreign policy.4 ° However, there is no evidence
that anyone involved on the American side favored or anticipated
that Diem and Nhu would be killed.4 In response to early hints
that the generals might kill Nhu, the Church Committee noted
that the DCI "directed that the United States would have no part
in such activity [assassination], and there is some evidence that
this information was relayed to the coup leaders."42 According to
the Church Committee report:
Although the United States Government supported the coup, there is
no evidence that American officials favored the assassination. In-
deed, it appears that the assassination of Diem was not a part of the
Generals' pre-coup planning but was instead a spontaneous act
which occurred during the coup and was carried out without United
States involvement or support.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 257.
39. Id. at 5.
40. Id. at 217-19.
41. See id. at 217-23.
42. Id. at 262.
43. Id. at 5.
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D. General Rene Schneider
It has on occasion been charged that the CIA played a role in
the 1970 assassination of General Rene Schneider, head of the
Chilean Army, whose strong commitment to constitutionalism
made him an obstacle to any plan to remove President Salvador
Allende from power by coup." According to the Church Commit-
tee, Schneider was not "assassinated" but rather died in an ex-
change of gunfire while resisting an effort to kidnap him. 5 The
report explains:
U.S. officials supplied financial aid, machine guns and other equip-
ment to various military figures who opposed Allende. Although the
CIA continued to support coup plotters up to Schneider's shooting,
the record indicates that the CIA had withdrawn active support of
the group which carried out the actual kidnap attempt on October
22, which resulted in Schneider's death. Further, it does not appear
that any of the equipment supplied by the CIA to coup plotters in
Chile was used in the kidnapping. There is no evidence of a plan to
kill Schneider or that United States officials specifically anticipated
that Schneider would be shot during the abduction.
[Ilt appears that the intention of both the dissidents and the United
States officials was to abduct General Schneider, not to kill him.
46
E. President Sukarno & "Papa Doc" Duvalier
The Church Committee also found evidence that the CIA had
(1) "contemplated" the assassination of Indonesian President Su-
karno, and (2) provided support to opponents of "Papa Doc" Duva-
lier in Haiti with the knowledge that he might be killed in the
course of an overthrow attempt-but without a CIA desire that he
be "assassinated."47 In their official findings and conclusions,
however, the Church Committee reported that "NO FOREIGN
LEADERS WERE KILLED AS A RESULT OF ASSASSINATION
PLOTS INITIATED BY OFFICIALS OF THE UNITED
STATES. 48
44. See id. at 225.
45. Id. at 5.
46. Id. at 5-6.
47. Id. at 4 n.1.
48. Id. at 256.
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F. Fidel Castro
The most extensive CIA program involving the possibility of
assassination involved Communist Cuba and its dictator, Fidel
Castro. Both during the Eisenhower and Kennedy years, policy-
makers pressured the CIA to act more aggressively to deal with
the Cuban threat.49 Phrases like 'dispose of Castro,"'' 0 "'remove
Castro,"'51 and "'knock off Castro"'52 were reportedly used and
conveyed-at least to some CIA officers-the impression that as-
sassination was an acceptable alternative. 3 However, in this in-
stance, the Church Committee could not establish awareness or
approval by senior policymakers in either administration for the
assassination of Castro. This result was consistent with the
prevalent theory of the era that the President ought to have
"plausible deniability" concerning certain covert operations.54
As summarized in the findings and conclusions of the 1975
Church Committee assassination report:
The effort to assassinate Castro began in 1960 [the final year of the
Eisenhower Administration and Castro's second year in power 55] and
continued until 1965. The plans to assassinate Castro using poison
cigars, exploding seashells, and a contaminated diving suit did not
advance beyond the laboratory phase. The plot involving underworld
figures reached the stage of producing poison pills, establishing the
contacts necessary to send them into Cuba, procuring potential as-
sassins within Cuba, and apparently delivering the pills to the is-
land itself. One 1960 episode involved a Cuban who initially had no
intention of engaging in assassination, but who finally agreed, at the
49. See id. at 274.




54. Id. at 11-12. There are obviously diplomatic advantages in the President being
able to express his shock and dismay to a foreign leader and to deny prior knowledge of
some covert operations that have been "blown" or made public. This is lost under the cur-
rent statutory scheme that requires a signed "presidential finding" for all such operations.
22 U.S.C. § 2414 (2000). In 1974, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by
conditioning the availability of funds for the CIA upon the President signing a written
"finding" asserting that every covert operation/special activity-"operations in foreign
countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence"- "is
important to the national security of the United States" and submitting a copy of the find-
ing to various congressional committees. Id. § 2422 (repealed 1991). Whether formally in-
volving the President in such activities outweighs the benefits of "plausible denial" is a
policy call.
55. Castro seized power in Cuba on January 7, 1959.
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suggestion of the CIA, to attempt to assassinate Raul Castro if the
opportunity arose. In the AMILASH operation, which extended from
1963 through 1965, the CIA gave active support and encouragement
to a Cuban whose intent to assassinate Castro was known, and pro-
vided him with the means of carrying out an assassination.
56
Much has been written about the CIA and Fidel Castro that I
have not read. But over the years, I have not heard or read any
serious attempt to argue that CIA plans to kill Fidel Castro were
anything other than immoral and contrary to international law.
Just entering college in 1963, I had neither knowledge nor in-
volvement in any alleged CIA assassination plot. But, had I been
older and retained as a lawyer to defend the policy, I believe that
a reasonable case could be argued that Castro's active support for
revolutionary groups in other countries for the purpose of over-
throwing the legal governments of those countries-in clear viola-
tion of Cuba's obligations under both the Charter of the United
Nations ("U.N. Charter") Charter57 and the Organization of
American States ("OAS") CharterS--justified the use of lethal
force in collective self-defense of other treaty partners. Castro's
covert efforts to overthrow other Latin American countries-
ranging from providing training to foreign guerrillas at various
camps in Cuba to smuggling funds and weapons to support ter-
rorist groups throughout the region-were clear violations of in-
ternational law and warranted acts of self-defense and collective
self-defense as recognized in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 9
On July 21, 1964, after years of complaints about Cuban efforts
to export revolution and overthrow various governments, the
Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of
the OAS resolved:
2. To condemn emphatically the present Government of Cuba for its
acts of aggression and of intervention against the territorial integ-
rity, the sovereignty, and the political independence of Venezuela.
56. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 255.
57. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
58. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119
U.N.T.S. 48, amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, 721
U.N.T.S. 324.
59. The article provides that "[n]othing... shall impair the inherent right of individ-
ual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Na-
tions...." U.N. CHARTER art. 51. See also ROBERT F. TURNER, NICARAGUA V. UNITED
STATES: A LOOK AT THE FACTS (1987).
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5. To warn the Government of Cuba that if it should persist in carry-
ing out acts that possess characteristics of aggression and interven-
tion against one or more of the member states of the Organization,
the member states shall preserve their essential rights as sovereign
states by the use of self-defense in either individual or collective
form, which could go so far as resort to armed force, until such time
as the Organ of Consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace
and security of the hemisphere.
60
It is not clear to me that in such a setting the use of lethal force
could not be aimed at Castro himself; but before I took that ar-
gument to the International Court of Justice, I would want my
money up front.
IV. A LOOK AT THE RELEVANT DOCTRINE
A. The Old Rule that Prohibited the Targeting of Regime Elites
Some say that even in self-defense you cannot target an ag-
gressor state's political leadership. There once was a rule of in-
ternational law that prohibited the killing of the other side's
king.61 It dates back to an earlier era, where kings set the rules
and where launching an aggressive war was the sovereign pre-
rogative of kings.62 But it still confuses much of today's legal de-
bate.
Ironically, even centuries ago, thoughtful international lawyers
questioned the wisdom of the "don't-hurt-the-king" rule. In 1588,
Alberico Gentili wrote in The Law of War that "the law bids
us... to punish only the party leaders, in order that the multi-
tude may be spared." 3 He then notes the emergence of a rule to
the contrary:
For now it is the common soldiers who are slain. The leaders, the
rich, are saved .... [O]ur worthy leaders consult for their own inter-
60. INTER-AM. INST. OF INT'L LEGAL STUDIES, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM: ITS
DEVELOPMENT AND STRENGTHENING 169 (1966).
61. See 2 ALBERICO GENTILI, THE THREE BOOKS ON THE LAW OF WAR 327 (John C.
Rolfe trans., William S. Hein & Co. 1995) (1612).
62. See id.
63. Id. at 322.
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ests in this new fashion; for if they should come into the hands of the
enemy, they would no longer have to fear for their own lives .... 64
In 1758, Emerich de Vattel displayed a similar disdain for the
"don't-hurt-the-king" rule:
In former times he who succeeded in killing the King or general of
the enemy was commended and rewarded .... Nothing could have
been more natural.., and frequently the death of the leader put an
end to the war. At the present day, a soldier would not dare, ordinar-
ily at least, to boast of having killed the enemy's King. It is thus tac-
itly agreed among sovereigns that their persons shall be held sa-
If there was ever any logic in giving special protection to ag-
gressive tyrants, it ended when aggressive war ceased to be rec-
ognized as a sovereign prerogative of kings and became, instead,
an international crime.
B. Aggression and Self-Defense
The use of war as an instrument of policy was outlawed in the
1928 Kellogg-Briand Treaty,66 and even more clearly by the U.N.
Charter.67 Moreover, Nuremberg established that sovereign im-
munity does not extend even to heads of state-who may be tried
and sentenced to death for the crime of aggressive war.6" Today,
the outdated "don't-hurt-the-king" rule makes absolutely no sense
legally or morally.
As Article 51 of the U.N. Charter makes clear, nothing in the
Charter prohibits states from threatening to use or using lethal
force when necessary for self-defense or for the defense of other
victims of aggression when a request for assistance is made.69
64. Id. at 325.
65. E. DE VATTEL, 3 THE LAWS OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 290
(James Brown Scott ed., William S. Hein & Co. 1983) (1758).
66. Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27,
1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 2344, 94 L.N.T.S. 57, 59-61.
67. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.").
68. See WERNER MASER, NUREMBERG: A NATION ON TRIAL 87-89 (Richard Barry
trans., Charles Scribner's Sons 1979) (1977).
69. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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There have historically been two requirements before lethal force
could be used in self-defense.
It must be "necessary," which means that peaceful attempts at
bringing the aggression to an end are ineffective. In addition, to be
lawful, defensive force must be "proportional," which is to say that
international law permits only that level of coercion necessary to
achieve the permitted goals (in the present crisis: the termination of
Iraqi aggression against Kuwait; the restoration of the status quo
ante and the release of foreign hostages).70
I would submit that the doctrine of proportionality favors the
option of intentionally killing the head tyrant as a means of end-
ing aggression, rather than sending our young men and women
onto the battlefield to slaughter-and be slaughtered by-the ty-
rant's young men and women. I have a theory of what I call the
"innocent soldier," based upon years of interaction with soldiers
from many countries. I think that their lives have moral value,
and I think international law ought to weigh that value as it de-
cides what behavior to make lawful. Saddam Hussein's soldiers
do not have the option of running off to Canada if they disagree
with his policies, and I would rather see him, and not his soldiers,
punished for his crimes.
I hate war, as only a man who has seen its horror can. I think
Sun Tzu was right when, more than 2500 years ago, he wrote
that "to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not
the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the
acme of skill."71
C. The So-Called "Bush Doctrine" and Its Precedent
The distinguished Yale historian, John Lewis Gaddis, was re-
cently quoted as saying "'there is almost no precedent in Ameri-
can diplomatic or military history for pre-emption.'
72
I disagree. I submit that President George W. Bush's threat to
use military force, if necessary, to stop Saddam Hussein from ac-
quiring deliverable nuclear weapons is not nearly so radical as it
70. Turner, supra note 8.
71. SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR 77 (Samuel B. Griffith trans., Oxford University Press
1963).
72. Craig Gilbert, Can U.S. Be First to Attack Enemy?, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar.
30, 2002, at 1A.
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may sound. Indeed, an obvious precedent was President Ken-
nedy's threat to use force to prevent Cuba from acquiring deliver-
able nuclear weapons that would threaten the United States.
It is worth comparing the two incidents. First, it was certainly
not illegal under customary or conventional international law for
the Soviet Union to sell or give nuclear-armed missiles to Cuba in
1962; and, of course, U.S. missiles located in Turkey aimed at the
Soviet Union at the time were also lawful.73 Today, it is a mani-
fest violation of international law for Iraq to acquire such weap-
ons-both because of its obligations under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty ("NPT")74 and because it is flagrantly violat-
ing its U.N. Charter obligations by failing to comply with numer-
ous orders from the Security Council under its binding Chapter
VII authority.75
Second, the reason Kennedy threatened Cuba was because of
the unusual nature of the Castro regime. Identified as an aggres-
sor by the OAS,76 Castro had been engaged in a variety of unlaw-
ful uses of force against our neighbors to the south.77 Similarly,
Iraq is a special case because of its long history of unlawful be-
havior.
A credible case can be made that force is authorized against
Iraq today under Security Council Resolution 678, which the Se-
curity Council has repeatedly emphasized remains in effect" and
73. See Barton J. Bernstein, Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Prob-
lems of the American Jupiters in Turkey, in THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS REVISITED 58
(James A. Nathan ed., 1992); ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTENTIONAL
CRISES AND THE ROLE OF LAW 23 (1974). •
74. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
729 U.N.T.S. 161.
75. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991); S.C.
Res. 707, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/707 (1991).
76. See 1 ORG. OF AM. STATES, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM: TREATIES,
CONVENTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS pt. 2, at 317 (1983).
77. See INTER-AM. INST. OF INT'L LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 60, 154-57.
78. See, for example, Security Council Resolution 686, which recalled and reaffirmed a
dozen previous resolutions dealing with Iraq, including Resolution 678, and affirmed that
all twelve "continue to have full force and effect." S.C. Res. 686, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., at
1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/686 (1991). Similarly, Resolution 687 affirmed Resolution 678 and
other previous resolutions. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 75, at 4. Resolution 689 specifically
noted that Security Council resolutions "can only be terminated by a decision of the Coun-
cil." S.C. Res. 689, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/689 (1991).
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which authorizes the use of military force against Iraq "to restore
international peace and security in the area."79
I think a credible case can be made that Hussein is a lawful
target because of his past and ongoing history of supporting in-
ternational terrorism, as well as his recent behavior. I do not pre-
tend to be an expert on the Middle East or Iraq, but among the
evidence that I find persuasive are: (1) there is considerable evi-
dence that Iraq was behind the February 1993 attack on the
World Trade Center; ° (2) based upon interviews with Iraqi pris-
oners, we know that Hussein has been cooperating with Osama
bin Laden for years in the furtherance of international terror-
ism;8 and (3) we know that an Iraqi intelligence agent met with
Mohammed Atta last year-probably more than once. 2 Hussein's
Baath political party recently endorsed the terrorist attacks now
taking place against Israel, and there is evidence that Hussein
has been providing funding to promote these attacks83-in further
gross violation of binding Security Council resolutions.8 4
As noted, the Security Council has passed numerous resolu-
tions that both denounce Iraq for violating its prior resolutions
and that denounce terrorism and those who support it.85 In this
79. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990). Resolu-
tion 678 specifically authorizes "under Chapter VII of the [U.N.] Charter":
Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on
or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1
above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and
implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and
to restore international peace and security in the area ....
Id.
80. See generally LAURIE MYLROIE, THE WAR AGAINST AMERICA (2001).
81. Jeffrey Goldberg, The Great Terror, NEW YORKER, Mar. 25, 2002, at 52, 66.
82. The Dossier Against a Dictator, TIMES (London), Aug. 29, 2002, at 17.
83. See, e.g., id. ("Saddam has for years acted as the champion of the Palestinian
cause, paying $25,000 (E16,500) to the families of suicide bombers. . . ."). Following the
reported death of long-time terrorist Abu Nidal in Baghdad, Brit Hume reported on Fox
News: "Now, what purports to be the real story from the London Telegraph: Nidal was ac-
tually in Baghdad as Saddam's personal guest in recent weeks and had come under pres-
sure to train al Qaeda terrorists to carry out attacks against U.S. interests. When Nidal
refused, he was assassinated by Saddam's security forces." Fox News Sunday (FOX televi-
sion broadcast, Aug. 25, 2002).
84. See S.C. Res. 687, supra note 75, at 9 (requiring Iraq "to inform the Security
Council that it will not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow any
organization directed towards commission of such acts to operate within its territory and
to condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism").
85. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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context, it has emphasized the right of members to use lethal
force in self-defense in response to terrorism.8 6
D. Anticipatory Self-Defense
The controversial doctrine of anticipatory self-defense also mer-
its reconsideration. 7 The 1973 "Six-Day War" in the Middle East
presents a classic example of what I believe was a lawful exercise
of that doctrine by Israel."8 The Israelis also used this theory to
justify their June 1981 attack on the Iraqi Osirak Nuclear Reac-
tor.89 The experts now tell us that had that attack not taken
place, Saddam Hussein would probably have possessed nuclear
weapons during Operation Desert Storm. 9°
Most international lawyers, as well as the U.N. Security Coun-
cil, adopted the view that Israel's actions were unlawful.9 After
all, if we allow countries to attack their neighbors just by claim-
ing they think the neighbor planned to attack them at some fu-
ture time, the provisions of Article 2(4) would be meaningless. 92
But I submit that the right of self-defense itself is subject to
abuse, as both Hitler and Kim I1 Sung alleged that they were in-
vading their neighbors in defensive response to a prior attack.
The world saw through that, and I believe we can see through bo-
gus claims of anticipatory self-defense.
Certainly the overwhelming presumption ought to be against
such a use of force. But, in a setting such as this, involving a ty-
rant who has already been guilty of repeated acts of unlawful in-
ternational aggression-who has used poison gas not only against
86. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
87. See generally JOHN NORTON MOORE, FREDERICK S. TIPSON & ROBERT F. TURNER,
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 162-63 (1990).
88. Id. at 154-92.
89. Barry L. Rothberg, Note, Averting Armageddon: Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in
the United States, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 79, 99 (1997). The air strike occurred on
June 7, 1981, with American jets flown by Israeli pilots.
90. The former Head of Iraq's Weapons Program, Hussein Kamel Majid, has ex-
pressed the sentiment that were it not for the Israeli attack, the possibility of a nuclear
strike in the early 1990s was possible. Id. at 96-97. Majid maintains that Iraq had a crash
program set to begin with weapons-grade uranium. Id.
91. Louis Rene Beres & Col. Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Reconsidering Israel's Destruc-
tions of Iraq's Osiraq Nuclear Reactor, 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. (stating that following
the attack, the United Nations Security Council criticized Israel for the unlawful activity
through a Resolution asking for Iraqi redress).
92. See id.; see also U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
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his neighbors, but against his own people93-a strong case can be
made.
Half-a-century ago there was logic in requiring the victim to
permit his attacker to take the first shot. Today, when faced with
a tyrant with Weapons of Mass Destruction ("WMD")-capable of
killing millions of people with a first strike94-I am not sure I see
the logic of continuing to abide by a rule that gives the bad guys a
"free kick" at the start of a conflict. The adherence to such a rule
makes even less sense in the case of a repeat offender like Sad-
dam Hussein, who has already claimed perhaps a million lives
through major acts of international aggression against Iran and
Kuwait and the use of WMDs, not only against Iran, but even
against his own people.9"
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Let me emphasize that this essay addresses legal and moral is-
sues. Obviously, however, a number of prudential and policy con-
siderations must be taken into consideration in policymaking, in-
cluding the likely reaction of other countries.
The distinction between "assassination" (murder) and the law-
ful use of lethal force in self-defense is a nuanced one, and resort-
ing to such a strategy by the United States may well be misun-
derstood by much of the world. Little reason exists to assume that
modern heads of state have any greater desire to be considered
"lawful targets" than their predecessors of the seventeenth cen-
tury, and it is much in their self-interest to prefer a law of armed
conflict that protects national leaders. Surely, some will argue, it
is more "civilized" to kill only soldiers. It may be that only by
knowing soldiers as individual human beings and then watching
93. See MYLROIE, supra note 80, at 140-41.
94. The August 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya demonstrated
that terrorist attacks can be coordinated, a point confirmed by the September 11, 2001,
attacks inside the United States. There is no reason to assume that, in cooperation with
various terrorist groups (and perhaps as well international organized crime, drug cartels,
and other violent groups), Saddam Hussein would not be able to coordinate simultaneous
nuclear or other WMD attacks on a dozen or more targets around the world. Imagine the
casualties that might result from coordinated attacks on New York, Los Angeles, Miami,
Tokyo, London, and other global population centers.
95. See MYLOROIE, supra note 80, at 133-47.
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them die allows one to fully appreciate the concept of an "inno-
cent soldier."
The point I am making is not that the United States ought to
intentionally target Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, or any
other aggressive tyrant. I am suggesting that to do so would not
in every instance constitute a violation of the law of armed con-
flict. It is an option which, like all targeting options, needs to be
carefully assessed in the context of the specific circumstances of a
given situation.
In some settings, for example, it may be that intentionally kill-
ing a foreign tyrant might allow his or her replacement to rule by
even more ruthless or effective leadership. This specific issue
arose during the discussions about assassinating Fidel Castro
during the Eisenhower and Kennedy years.96 In other cases, "cut-
ting off the head of the enemy" might leave a leaderless adversary
in which angry soldiers rampage uncontrolled and uncontrollable.
It may be argued that a policy of intentionally trying to kill
someone like Saddam Hussein might encourage him to first try to
kill American leaders. I submit that it is more a theoretical than
real problem, as leaders willing to flagrantly violate the most
fundamental principles of the U.N. Charter are unlikely to be
constrained by a deep respect for the rule of law. Saddam Hus-
sein has already been involved in one attempt to murder an
American president,97 and one can only hope that anyone who be-
lieves that the law will constrain our nation's enemies from at-
tacking will never have a role in directing the Secret Service.
On balance, there may be a parallel with the issue of holding
political leaders personally accountable after a conflict ends. Hus-
sein knows that he will be tried as a war criminal and either exe-
cuted or sent to prison for life if he loses the war; he has less in-
centive to "cut his losses" and seek peace if battles go badly. By
fighting to the end, he imposes a much higher cost on those who
would protect his victims.
Another parallel might be drawn with the dilemma about
whether to bargain with hostage takers. Why not grant them
96. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 269.
97. President William Jefferson Clinton, Televised Address Before the American Pub-
lic from the Oval Office (June 26, 1993), in Clinton: U.S. Needed "To Send a Message,"
WASH. POST, June 27, 1993, at A20.
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amnesty if they agree to release the remaining hostages-that is
certainly more likely to save the lives of the innocent hostages. Is
punishing one or two wrongdoers worth the lives of a dozen or
more innocent citizens?
Then there is the "three strikes and you're out" policy,9" which
tells repeat offenders engaged in violent crime that they might as
well kill any witnesses because they have no chance of ever see-
ing freedom if they are identified and caught. One might add the
number of sexually molested children who are murdered each
year because of the severe sentences the law imposes upon preda-
tors who sexually assault the young. 9 Would it not be better to be
more moderate in our punishment so that pedophiles might spare
the lives of their victims?
In the short-term view, none of these policies may make sense.
But if you believe that Sun Tzu was right, and that deterrence is
better than winning lots of armed conflicts,' ° then incentive
structures matter. In September 1990, former Secretary of De-
fense Richard Cheney fired the Air Force Chief of Staff for sug-
gesting that Saddam Hussein would personally be targeted if the
United States had to use military force to eject Iraqi forces from
Kuwait.' 01 But, the unintended consequence of that decision was
to assure Hussein that he had nothing personal to lose in the con-
flict. If Iraq succeeded, Hussein could send the revenues from
Kuwaiti oil wells to bank accounts in Switzerland. If the invasion
was repulsed by the international community, Iraqi citizens
would lose their sons and fathers, but Hussein would personally
lose little.
My colleague John Norton Moore and I teach an interdiscipli-
nary advanced seminar on "War & Peace," building upon work we
first began while serving respectively as Chairman of the Board
and President of the United States Institute of Peace. We are per-
98. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (2000) (addressing punishment schemes for offenses pro-
viding for a life term if convicted of a third felony).
99. See id. § 2241 (2000) (allowing the imposition of life imprisonment for aggravated
sexual assault of a minor); id. § 2243 (2000) (stating the punishment for the sexual abuse
of a minor is fifteen years imprisonment); id. § 2251 (2000) (addressing punishment for the
sexual exploitation of children).
100. SUN TZU, supra note 71, at 77.
101. See Turner, supra note 8 (stating that "[t]he recent suggestion by Michael J.
Dugan, then Air Force chief of staff, that the United States might seek to 'decapitate' Iraqi
leadership by targeting Saddam Hussein, his family and even his mistress, caused a great
deal of understandable outrage in this country and abroad").
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suaded that wars result from two factors: (1) the existence of to-
talitarian, or highly authoritarian, political systems in which ty-
rants can internalize the benefits and externalize the costs of ag-
gression; and (2) a failure of their victims and/or the world
community to create in the mind of the potential aggressor the
perception that the costs to him of engaging in aggression will
clearly outweigh the benefits.
It may well be that, in any given conflict, the threat of being
held accountable through post-war judicial proceedings as a war
criminal will reduce the probability of a quick resolution of the
conflict once the world community gains the upper hand. How-
ever, logic suggests that such a policy will also discourage other
potential aggressors from initiating war and, in the long run,
produce a more peaceful world consistent with Sun Tzu's wise
maxim.
If Saddam Hussein knows that by launching aggression
against his neighbors the world community's preferred response
is not going to be to send its soldiers to kill the unfortunate-and
relatively innocent-men and women who make up the Iraqi mili-
tary; but instead to attempt to apprehend and, if necessary, kill
the criminal who ordered the aggression, this policy is likely to
provide a strong disincentive to engage in aggressive behavior.
Such a policy, I submit, would fulfill Sun Tzu's preferred strategy
of "subdu[ing] the enemy without fighting."10 2
VI. CONCLUSION
I personally believe that the United States violated interna-
tional law during the Cuban Missile Crisis. I am also glad that we
did, as peace was served by our actions. The experts will disagree
about whether it is lawful at this point to use lethal force against
Saddam Hussein. But few serious people will question that the
world would be a safer place in his absence, and even fewer would
mourn his death.
True assassination is murder, and murder is wrong. It is im-
perative that any doctrine involving the intentional targeting of
aggressor regime elites be fully and carefully explained to Amer-
102. SUNTzU, supra note 71, at 77.
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ica and the world community in moral and legal terms, and that
it be distinguished from an act of assassination. Thus, there is no
reason to alter the order prohibiting assassination. °3
One might hypothesize about rare circumstances in which as-
sassination might be justified. In 1990, Gerald Bull was shot re-
peatedly in the back of his head, "execution-style," in the hallway
of his Brussels apartment building.'0 4 Because Bull was consid-
ered one of the most brilliant artillery scientists in the world and
had reportedly been involved in assisting Saddam Hussein to de-
velop a massive cannon that could reach Israel, there was much
speculation that his killer was working for Israel.' Some who
knew Bull asserted that he had no intention of helping Hussein
build military weapons to harm Israel, but believed that his ad-
vice was being used to make a giant cannon to launch satellites
into orbit.10 6
It could be argued that, given Hussein's long history of aggres-
sive behavior and his repeated threats against Israel,' °7 using le-
thal force to deny Iraq such a weapon was justifiable as a "defen-
sive" act. If not, the use of force could have been viewed as
justifiable by Israel in order to protect the large numbers of civil-
ians such a weapon might threaten.
Perhaps a situation will someday arise in which an American
President concludes that killing someone like Bull is necessary
for national security purposes. Most likely, such an act would
constitute self-defense even if the "victim" had no aggressive in-
tentions. One could conceive of a setting in which a bad actor de-
ceived even a child to carry a satchel into a crowded stadium
without revealing that the satchel contained a WMD that would
kill tens of thousands of innocent people. Postulate that the child
does not understand English, and the only person able to stop
him is across a river and equipped only with a sniper rifle, and
103. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 app. at
58-64(1994).




107. Id. (noting that Hussein threatened a chemical strike in 1990 if Israel tried to at-
tack Iraq); Joel Greenberg, Again, Israel Worries About Iraq, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 8, 1998, § 4,
at 5; see also Douglas Frantz, Bush Had Hands-On Role in Baghdad Aid, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
26, 1992, at Al.
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intentionally killing the innocent child becomes morally and le-
gally justifiable as the only way of saving the larger group." 8
Hypothesize further that the United States has advance knowl-
edge of these events, but for some reason is unable to act other
than by shooting the child. I would argue strongly that such a
decision would not constitute assassination because it is justifi-
able defense. But if the President concluded that it was a close-
call, the simple reality is that the President is not bound by ex-
ecutive orders, since such orders are not statutes or laws, but
merely edicts of the President that are binding only upon employ-
ees of the executive branch-enforced by the possibility of job
termination or lesser punishment-unless reinforced by stat-
ute.'0 9 Thus, Section 2.11 of Executive Order 12,333 could simply
be ignored by the President and a specific presidential authoriza-
tion of more recent date in conflict with a prior order would re-
lieve the shooter from liability.110 In broader terms, the President
could formally suspend all or part of an executive order either for
a specific military mission or permanently and, if warranted, for
national security reasons done by classified directive without dis-
closing the decision to the public. This ability gives the President
ample authority if a situation ever arose in which an intentional
killing might be necessary in a setting-assuming for the sake of
discussion one might arise-that was not clearly justified by the
doctrine of self-defense. However, if the killing took place within
the jurisdiction of United States federal or state criminal laws,
the presidential order might well not immunize the shooter (or
the President) from subsequent criminal liability. That issue,
while important, is beyond the scope of my remarks.
When I wrote in The Washington Post that Saddam Hussein
was a lawful target in early October 1990,"' I thought the case
ought to be made but was far from certain that it was a wise pol-
icy doctrine. At worst, I concluded, it might add a small measure
of deterrence and give Hussein one more reason to withdraw his
108. To make the moral dilemma easier in this hypothetical, one can assume that the
child would also die when the satchel exploded.
109. See Gary D. Solis, Assassination and American Armed Forces, MIL. L. NEWS, Au-
tumn 2001, at 6.
110. Cf. Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 555 (1956) (finding executive order revoked by
subsequent order).
111. Turner, supra note 8.
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forces from Kuwait before multilateral force could be used against
him.112
In the dozen years that have followed, as I have looked more
and more at the importance of incentive structures in the busi-
ness of deterrence, I am all the more persuaded that this ought to
be a lawful policy option. Whether it ought to be used in a given
situation depends upon the specific circumstances of each case.
But if it ever is used, it is important for the United States to ex-
plain its behavior and to make it clear that what is being done is
distinct from the criminal act of assassination.
112. Id.
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